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assistance, and Congress must maintain close surveillance over it.

I am not optimistic that even if he wanted to the President could make a political settlement in Vietnam. I feel that the military and even foreign policy agencies of our Government are so committed to a military solution in Vietnam that, in the President's word the other night at the political banquet, they will persevere in Vietnam without a local government, if necessary, or by imposing one on the people if possible. They will persevere until the north and south are devastated; they will persevere until we are involved irretrievably in a war with China.

I deeply regret that President Johnson is not interested in persevering with the United Nations. I regret that he is not interested in persevering with his peace offensive, that he is not seeking to persevere in obtaining a ceasefire and in obtaining the help of the U.N. in policing it; that he goes to Honolulu instead of the session of the United Nations to make a plea to them calling for a cease-fire order in Vietnam, with a pledge that we will cooperate in carrying it out if the members that are pledged by their signatures to the charter will likewise give assurance that they will join in enforcing such a cease-fire. I regret these things because we have reached the stage in Vietnam where American disengagement on almost any terms would be preferable to further sacrifice of American life for nothing.

Finally, on Saturday I took part in a foreign policy forum sponsored by Muhlenberg College in Allentown, Pa. Five local colleges joined in that forum, in which Senator STENNIS and I were the speakers and the discussion was moderated by Max Frankel of the New York Times. I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my statement my prepared remarks be printed in the RECORD followed by an article by Jean Lacouture from the May 12 New York Review of Books entitled: "Vietnam: The Turning Point," and various communications I have received on this subject.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibits 2, 3, and 4.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I am having inserted in the RECORD the statement that I made at Allentown, Pa., on Saturday, because, interestingly enough, it will contain an answer to the point of view expressed by my good friend, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] in regard to our relationship with France, and also setting forth my views in regard to the NATO crisis.

I wonder how many Americans, if they were Frenchmen, would be voting to leave thousands and thousands of American troops on French soil, in view of the military record we are making elsewhere in the world.

Why are we so surprised that there is a growing concern and fear of American military power in France? We interpret SEATO, of which France is a member, entirely to suit ourselves and without regard to the news or interests of the other parties. How can we expect the

NATO members know whether we will use and interpret the North Atlantic Treaty the same way?

The trouble with us is we do not like to look at ourselves. The trouble with us is that we think our Narcissus image that we have painted for ourselves is accepted by millions of people elsewhere in the world. The trouble with Americans these days is that we do not recognize the fact that we are bitterly hated by millions of people in many places of the world, for they see all the difference between our verbal statements and our actions, and condemn us for a growing hypocrisy, of which we are guilty.

Mr. President, would that my conscience and my convictions did not dictate that I must warn the American people: "It is not too late for you to exercise the check that the Constitution gives you to stop this trend away from democracy in America and bring your Government back within the framework of constitutional power."

NEED FOR CIA COMMITTEE

All one need do to learn about the danger is to read the RECORD made earlier this afternoon on the floor of the Senate in regard to the CIA. It is hard to believe that it would be seriously proposed in the Senate that a small group of senior citizens should have a monopolistic right to have access to information dealing with the operation of a police state institution that has been allowed to grow up in the body politic of this Republic, for the CIA is a police institution that has no place in democracy except under careful surveillance of our check-and-balance system.

As I listened to the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] seek to justify the type relationship that exists between the CIA and the select few in this body who can have access to some information of the CIA, I knew that my case was proved.

By what right—and I speak respectfully of him—does the Senator from Massachusetts think the American people are protected because he has his meetings in various forums—and I think the record will show in his home and others—with McCone or Allen Dulles or Raborn? What kind of check is that on the CIA?

Of course, I have voted hundreds of millions of dollars for a spy system; but I have not voted for a spy system free from the check of the elected representatives of the American people and of Congress. In my judgment, the security of no country, in my judgment, is such that it is necessary to engage in that kind of police-state system.

So I join with the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], and other Senators when I say that the CIA should be checked, and that the Committee on Foreign Relations should have the representation of a watchdog committee to check it.

Let me also say that I do not accept the major premise that the elected officials of the American people should not have an opportunity to be briefed in ex-

regard to what their checking committee has found.

To get the ugly reality out on the floor of the Senate—for I think it is here, and I think some of the facts this afternoon skirted on the edges of it—those who are on the "in" with the CIA do not want the Committee on Foreign Relations or representatives of that committee to have any checking voice in connection with the affairs of the CIA. My conclusion is that they run a pretty good chance that members of the Committee on Foreign Relations would not agree with many of the things that the CIA is doing in the field of foreign policy.

I yield to no one in my high regard for the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], but I completely disagree with his position on the CIA. For the Senator from Georgia, when he says that the CIA really did not determine foreign policy in connection with the Bay of Pigs, is grossly mistaken. The fact that John Fitzgerald Kennedy later assumed full responsibility for that fiasco does not change the fact that the CIA misled him. CIA both formulated and executed a foreign policy at the Bay of Pigs and it continues doing so today. I conducted the executive session hearings in regard to the investigation of the CIA, and I say to the Senate this afternoon that I am perfectly satisfied it never would have occurred except for the CIA. The President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, never would have been misled except for the CIA. In fact, I hold the CIA more responsible than the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although they also misled the President.

The sad thing is that President Kennedy came to recognize it and told a considerable number of us so, but he made a great mistake when they sold him a bill of goods that he should not consult Congress.

Imagine what would have happened if John Fitzgerald Kennedy had come back to the Foreign Relations Committee and apprised it of the recommendations being made for the Bay of Pigs. Why, Mr. President, of one thing you can be certain, and that is that the overwhelming majority of the Foreign Relations Committee would have advised against it, as the chairman of the committee did when he was apprised of it at the eleventh hour, under a strict doctrine of privilege.

Of course, it is to the great historic credit of President Kennedy that he assumed the responsibility. But I have been heard to say before, and say now, irrespective of his statement about responsibility, that the wrongdoers were the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Bay of Pigs is one example to which I wish to invite the attention of the American people as supporting part of my fear of the growing power of the American military, including the CIA, in the formulation of American foreign policy.

Of course, CIA is a foreign policy agency. Whether it is supervised by the President and the State Department is not the issue here. The issue for us is whether the congressional check upon CIA should extend only to the Armed

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Services and Appropriations Committees, but not to the Foreign Relations Committee, when its activities in fact have as much to do with foreign affairs as with military affairs.

I know that John Fitzgerald Kennedy, prior to his death, expressed the view that he was also concerned about whether he was being sucked into—and that was his language—sucked into another Bay of Pigs in Vietnam. That is why he sent his Ambassador to India, Mr. Galbraith, to Vietnam to make a study and to report to him.

There is no doubt about the advice that the Ambassador gave, and that the Ambassador in his findings supported the position that I was taking at that time, the same position President Kennedy was taking before his death. I had expressed to him, before his death, my great concern for the course of action he was following in Vietnam because, as I said to the President, "What concerns me is the military advisers being only a step away from ground troops." Although the President said it was not his intention, nevertheless, it was perfectly obvious that that is what would happen unless the President stopped the course of action he was following.

No one knows what he would have done had he lived, but I am satisfied that the Galbraith report shook him. I am also satisfied that, had the President lived, we would not be escalating the war in Vietnam today. That war would have been either settled on honorable terms, or we would be out.

Thus, as I close my speech, this will be the first time I have ever said this, because it is the first time that I have come to this conclusion: If the United Nations continues to refuse to live up to its treaty obligations of enforcing the peace in South Vietnam, as it did in the Congo, as it is doing in the Gaza Strip, as it is doing in Cyprus, and as it did in the war between India and Pakistan, if my President continues to refuse to call upon an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to call for a cease-fire order, and pledge that they will support a cease-fire order—and we will cooperate with it—then let me say that my Government cannot possibly justify the continuing slaughter of young Americans in Vietnam in support of a corrupt military junta in Vietnam, a junta which today is beginning a civil war within a civil war and which the American people are entitled to have stopped. If the President refuses to follow these other procedures, then I believe the time will have come for us to say that unless these procedures are followed, we should get out and let South Vietnam determine its own policies.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. I merely wish to say that I find myself in complete accord with the analysis which the distinguished Senator from Oregon has made about the situation in Vietnam. What is happening there today is what he and I have been saying for over 2 years now, that

we have no business in Vietnam, that nothing whatever justifies our being there militarily, that the American people have been constantly misled and misinformed, and that they are being led down an ever-deepening pit to disaster.

No one has said these things more effectively, more frequently, and more courageously than the Senator from Oregon. It is my hope that the American people, when they get the facts which have been so long concealed from them, will rise in their wrath and mobilize public opinion to do something about it, and stop this utterly unjustified, illegal, and immoral war.

It is utterly inexcusable that we should be drafting American boys and sending them to be slaughtered in Vietnam, and to kill people against whom they have no grievance whatsoever, against whom we have no grievance as a Nation, whose actions do not in any way jeopardize the security of the United States.

We, the United States, while charging aggression to others, are actually the aggressor. We are the nation that went halfway around the world to barge into a civil war between Vietnamese. We were the outsider. We were the intruder. We are the aggressor. And we violated solemn treaty commitments in the process.

Mr. MORSE. I completely agree with the Senator from Alaska. Let me make this closing comment about him. It has been more than 2 years that the Senator and I stood together in the Senate on this question, most of the time almost alone. This year we have been getting some support—not many votes yet, but it is encouraging—at least receiving public recognition from men who are expressing grave doubts as to the soundness of previous votes in the Senate. It may be that we will start getting some votes. I believe that we will have a better opportunity to get more votes for our position when the votes out in the hustings start to be counted next November. But, let me say to my good friend, the Senator from Alaska, that if we wish to use a figure of speech, what we really are trying to do is to support the stability of a bowl of jelly in Vietnam.

I want to say to Mr. McNamara that he cannot make a bowl of jelly very acceptable by the type of aid we are giving Vietnam because of the civil war within a civil war. Vietnam, because of the nature of its junta leaders, I think can best be described as a bowl of jelly; and I do not intend to remain silent while my Government mistakenly, as the Senator from Alaska has pointed out, continues to send men in the flower of their manhood, with all of life before them, from this country into South Vietnam, to be killed in a war in a country where we had no right to go in the first place and in which we cannot justify, on moral or legal grounds, continuing to stay. The American people must show that they want the President to stop, with their ballots, by defeating those who continue to vote to send American boys into Vietnam to support a bowl of jelly.

I want to thank the Senator from Alaska for his leadership, for he has

been, as I have said previously, on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere, one of my teachers in the field of foreign policy.

I am willing to stand shoulder to shoulder with him as history judges the historic debate of the last few years in regard to this subject.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News, May 16, 1966]

CIVIL STRIFE DEEPENS AFTER DA NANG SEIZURE: KY'S FORCES ALERTED FOR ATTACK FROM HUE

DA NANG, May 16 (UPI)—Forces loyal to Premier Nguyen Cao Ky which seized control of Da Nang yesterday with machine guns, tanks and fighter planes were alerted today for possible attack by antigovernment troops from Hue.

There was no immediate indication that troops of the First Vietnamese Division, commanded by Gen. Phan Xuan Nuuan, had started an advance from Hue toward Da Nang, 60 miles to the southwest.

At latest reports, a regiment of Gen. Nuuan's men was digging defensive positions on the outskirts of Hue.

An appeal issued in the names of Gen. Nuuan and Maj. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, commander of the Second Division, called on soldiers and civilians to "rise up and fight."

Buddhist leaders in Saigon, meanwhile, summoned antigovernment elements to a mass meeting tonight which could lead to a showdown with Premier Ky's government.

The Buddhists had declared earlier that Gen. Ky's attack in Da Nang had brought the nation to the brink of "unavoidable" civil war.

Militant Buddhist youth leader Thich Thien Minh called the mass rally to tell the people of the government's "betrayal." Buddhist youths urged monks to let them stage a torch-light parade thru the streets.

Combat police and a crack paratrooper battalion were standing by in case of trouble.

The mass rally could become the first official "call to arms" since Gen. Ky's troops seized control of Da Nang.

Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu told the nation by radio last night that the government was forced to act in Da Nang because of communist subversion, continuing unrest and illegal movements in the northern provinces.

He called on the people to realize the danger and share with the government the task of restoring national solidarity.

U.S. officials refused to discuss any possible American involvement. There were indications, however, the Americans were told of Gen. Ky's plans in advance.

EXHIBIT 2

REMARKS OF SENATOR WAYNE MORSE, MUHLENBERG COLLEGE, ALLENTOWN, PA. MAY 14, 1966

The program of your Foreign Policy Forum is an indication of the response which I think is to be found in many parts of the country to the Vietnam and China hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

It is sometimes said in disparagement of the teaching profession that "those who can, do, and those who can't, teach." Although the Senate is supposed to have a special responsibility in the field of foreign relations through its advice and consent to treaties, the great bulk of foreign policy matters are handled without benefit of treaty, and we have seen many evidences in recent weeks that Senatorial advice, without consent, is viewed by the Administration with scorn and outright resentment. So we in the Senate, and we on the Foreign Relations Committee, do not make foreign policy; we do not di-